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The challenges of commissioning home care for older people in 
England: commissioners’ perspectives  
 
Abstract 
Home care for older people in England is commissioned through local authorities working 
predominantly with independent providers of care. Commissioners operate in a market model, 
planning and procuring home care services for local populations. Their role involves 
‘managing’ and ‘shaping’ the market, to ensure an adequate supply of care providers. Another 
imperative, emerging from the principles of personalisation, is the drive to achieve user 
outcomes rather than ‘time and task’ objectives. Little formal research has investigated the 
way commissioners reconcile these different requirements and organise commissioning. This 
study investigated commissioning approaches using qualitative telephone interviews with ten 
commissioners from different local authorities in England. The characteristics of 
commissioning were analysed thematically. Findings indicated (i) commissioning policy 
involved complex systems and processes, uniquely shaped for the local context, but frequently 
changed, suggesting a constant need for reframing commissioning arrangements; (ii) 
partnerships with providers were mainly transactional, with occasional examples of 
collaborative models, that were considered to facilitate flexible services more appropriate for  
commissioning for personalised outcomes; (iii) only a small number of commissioners had 
attempted to reconcile the competing and incompatible goals of tightly prescribed contracting 
and working collaboratively with providers. A better understanding of flexible contracting 
arrangements and the hallmarks of a trusting collaboration is required to move beyond the 
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Introduction 
Policy and legislation relating to home care for older people in England sets out a strategy for 
the way services should be procured and delivered based on contracting between the public 
sector and independent providers (Department of Health and Social Care, 2018). 
Commissioning policy, underpinned by the theory of contracting, has evolved over many 
years, with the emphasis changing from a simple purchaser - provider model, that in retrospect 
failed to deliver more effective public services (Davies, Nutley and Smith 2000; Knapp, Hardy, 
Forder 2001), to a commissioner - provider arrangement. Currently a commissioning cycle is 
used, with activities intended to ensure publicly funded services in social care and health are 
appropriately sourced and monitored, delivering necessary outcomes for service users 
(Department of Health, 2014; Kings Fund, 2017). Changes in policy have been shaped by 
political and ideological drivers, rather than empirical evidence (Davies, Nutley and Smith 
2000), potentially resulting in commissioning plans that lack a clear rationale and coherence. 
This paper presents the views of commissioners regarding commissioning arrangements with 
independent home care providers. It investigates the implications of contracting and 
collaborating on service quality and identifies some of the barriers to successful 
commissioning experienced by local authority commissioners in England. The motivation for 
the study stemmed from our engagement with commissioners in previous research that 
indicated that practice was diverse and prone to significant challenges (Chester, Hughes and 
Challis, 2010). Details of these challenges are rarely reported in the research literature and a 
better understanding of what commissioners are doing to resolve them, and how satisfied they 
are with the solutions, could support the development of more effective commissioning in the 
future, potentially fulfilling the imperative for person centred practice in home care delivery. 
This is set in the context of previous studies of commissioning to identify general issues 
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relating to commissioning in public services and then appraise studies specifically 
investigating commissioning of home care for older people. 
Commissioning practice typically involves assessing local needs, overseeing procurement of 
services and developing service specifications as part of a competitive contracting process. It 
demands a complex set of skills and knowledge, but may not include an understanding of the 
underpinning ideology and how this is changing (Bamford, 2013). The once hegemonic belief 
that a market model in commissioning can enable client choice and improve quality of services 
is now considered outdated (Bovaird 2006) with critiques of the model evident in health and 
social care sector in England (for example, Iacobucci 2019). Policy directives have changed 
the expectations made of commissioners, with the role of local authorities in England in 
overseeing social care developing and changing over the last three decades. Responsibilities 
have changed from a direct provider of care to an enabling agency (Jasper et al., 2019). 
Successive government policies championed competition between providers as the 
mechanism to drive improvements. In doing so, local authorities were stepping into unknown 
and untested territory, adopting roles more usually found in commercial business, such as 
sourcing providers, negotiating contracts and monitoring arrangements. Nevertheless, as 
reforms have progressed, the emphasis has moved beyond a market model based on 
contractual arrangements to a shared endeavour to ensure local authorities ‘embed the 
principle and practice of commissioning on the basis of quality, outcomes and value for money 
in their areas’ and ‘bring an end to commissioning practices that undermine people’s dignity 
and choice.’ (p 46 Cm 8378, 2012). However, changes, enshrined in the Care Act (2014) and 
amplified in statutory guidance (Department of Health and Social Care, 2018) for social care, 
continue to advocate ‘managing’ and ‘shaping’ the market. Commissioners are expected to 
enact high level guidance according to their own local context, potentially resulting in 
considerable variation in practice. The contractual arrangement between local authorities and 
home care providers, as independent businesses, is an exemplar of how a market model 
involving public-private partnerships not only operates in practice, but also alters over time. 
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However, relatively little is known about what determines decision-making by commissioners 
of care services, as they interpret abstract requirements such as market shaping and 
management (Coleman, Checkland, Harrison 2009).  
Previous analysis of models of commissioning, based on developments in health and social 
care, suggests three principal areas of interest: (i) the process of commissioning and 
contracting; (ii) the role of markets and competition; and (iii) commissioning relationships 
(Newman et al., 2012). According to these authors, the three elements are rarely considered 
together. For example, contracting literature identifies the typical characteristics of contracts 
for commissioning but infrequently links this to the nature of commissioning relationships or 
outcomes for service users. The different contracts employed in commissioning, such as one-
off exchanges or longer-term contracts (spot or block contracts), complete or incomplete 
contracts (highly specified/ closed or open ended), and explicit or implicit contracts (written or 
unwritten shared understandings) (Mackintosh 2000), may each assist or impede the provision 
of quality services in different ways. There is some evidence, for instance, suggesting that 
more open contracts encourage flexibility in service delivery that then facilitates more 
personalised care. This then offers greater choice for service users and opportunities for more 
meaningful relationships to develop between service users and care workers (Raynes et al., 
2001; Van Slyke 2006; Glendinning et al., 2008). The growing interest in the notion of relational 
contracting (Bertelli and Smith, 2009), based on trust and collaboration rather than 
transactional contracting, features in health research, but is less evident in social care (for 
example, Porter et al., 2013). Some researchers have reasoned that relational contracts are 
particularly important for longer term arrangements, even viewing other contractual 
arrangements as ‘dangerous’, arguing that unanticipated difficulties can be accommodated 
when resilience and adaptability have been encouraged as part of long-term contract (Bovaird 
2016).  
Commissioning home care is an example where contracting from independent and voluntary 
sector providers has increased notably (more than ninety percent) over recent years (Holmes, 
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2016). Three specific challenges for commissioners are associated with this change. First, 
commissioners have been expected to influence the entire home care market across a local 
area. The Care Act (2014) stipulated that commissioners should consider people who fund 
their own care in market shaping activities, given the potential role of self-funders in sustaining 
independent providers who also deliver care packages that are publicly funded. However, 
current research indicates that self-funders are largely unknown to authorities and so 
commissioners are now tasked with finding novel ways to understand the requirements and 
considerations of ‘elusive’ self-funders, who also contribute to market shaping (Henwood, 
2019). Further challenges include the role of direct payments that individuals receive from 
local authorities, and how their allocation may also influence the market for home care (Moran 
et al., 2013)  
Second, there is an intractable problem in gathering meaningful information regarding the 
overall effectiveness of outcome-based home care (Smith et al., 2017). Commissioners can 
respond to this information problem in two ways, first, demanding more and more data from 
providers, aided by technology and electronic monitoring, but not necessarily enabling care to 
be delivered in the best way. Alternatively, they can accept open contracts, endeavouring to 
build trust with providers dependent on a closer collaboration that proffers freedom to make 
decisions and manage service delivery with less tight scrutiny. Finally, commissioning 
guidance has encouraged a more flexible outlook to contracting, resulting in a range of 
different types of contracts used in any combination. Commissioners are using ‘spot’ contracts, 
‘block’ contracts and ‘framework agreements’ across social care (Wilberforce, Baxter and 
Glendenning, 2012; Davies et al., 2019). Preferences for contract type are changing and 
commissioning arrangements are moving from block and spot contracts to framework 
agreements in the field of home care, with the assumption that this affords greater flexibility 
during the procurement process (Rodrigues and Glendinning, 2015). A framework agreement 
includes several approved providers for a locality, with set prices and standards, potentially 
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assuring the supply of providers, but nevertheless generating disadvantages for care 
businesses, such as a lack of certainty and guaranteed workflow. 
The complexities inherent in managing and shaping the market raise the question of how 
commissioners reconcile contradictory drivers, such as operating a market model, whilst 
introducing innovative solutions to improve the quality and quantity of care provision in a local 
market (Ware et al., 2003; Rubery, Grimshaw, Hebson, 2013). They are faced with the option 
of either adapting practice to navigate the problems or maintaining the rigid application of a 
contracting model that may stifle progress. For example, providers, interviewed in one study, 
considered that commissioners were inflexible and risk averse, committed to a ‘time and task 
approach’ that restricted providers’ efforts to deliver person centred care (Bottery, 2018). As 
the author points out, employing a ‘time and task’ method may be difficult to avoid in a tough 
competitive tendering process. Consequently, imperfect solutions are likely to be employed 
that involve contradictory discourses, such as the adoption of the language of new models 
whilst preserving old systems (Glendinning et al., 2006). Little is known about the ways 
commissioners navigate these difficulties and what is considered when adaptations to existing 
systems are made. This paper presents a study of the views of commissioners regarding 
commissioning arrangements with independent home care providers, investigating the 
implications of contracting and collaborating on service quality. 
Research Aims 
The research aims for the study were to evidence commissioners’ approaches to arranging 
home care for older people in relation to:  
1. Their perceptions about what they were expected to do 
2. Their perceptions about the constraints they believed they needed to take into account 
3. Their identification of, and response to, challenges they were trying to resolve and their 





The study addresses the knowledge gap of seeking to understand how commissioners of 
home care for older people are trying to manage and shape the market as required by the 
Care Act (2014). A qualitative method was employed to identify differences between 
commissioners and how they saw their role and responsibilities. This provided the opportunity 
to explore, in depth, their expectations, experiences and difficulties, in order to reveal the 
challenges of operating in a market model. The paper presents the qualitative phase of a 
mixed method study of home care arrangements investigating changes in commissioning 
arrangements in England (redacted for review). Within the scope of the study, views of 
commissioners of home care services in ten local authority areas in England were collected 
using semi-structured interviews. Local authorities were carefully selected from a national 
survey of all English local authorities conducted in the wider study (Davies et al., 2019) 
The study conformed to ethical guidelines for telephone interviewing with informed consent 
gained over the phone and recorded on a consent form by the researcher. Ethical approval 
was given by the Social Care Research Ethics Committee (17/IEC08/0016).   
Recruitment and participants  
Local authorities were selected according to their responses to a national survey conducted 
in the first stage of the study (Davies et al., 2019). Authorities were grouped reflecting their 
collective approach to commissioning. This was based on responses relating to contracting 
arrangements, provider consultation and contribution to specifications and use of providers 
who subcontracted services as part of their responsibility for the local authority contract. Local 
authority commissioners, representing different ways of working, were approached and 
agreed to participate. They were invited to take part in the study via an email that included an 
explanation of the study and information about the data collection. Commissioners replied to 




The research team developed a topic guide for semi-structured interviews using issues raised 
in previous studies and guided by an advisory group of researchers and advisers from the 
home care and commissioning sector (Table 1). This was trialled initially with one 
commissioner prompting changes to the format and wording of the interview questions. The 
interview guide comprised of five topic areas, with opportunity for prompts and follow-on 
questions to encourage participants to elaborate their responses (Breakwell, 2006). Each 
interview was audio recorded and took approximately 60 minutes to complete.  
Table 1: Topic guide for commissioner interview 
           Topic areas Interview questions 




What are your current arrangements with home care providers? 
a. How many providers do you commission? 
b. How do you work with your health partners in 
commissioning home care? [CCG role]  




How would you describe the process of commissioning? 
 
Who is involved in commissioning and when does this happen? 
 
How long do your contracts last? 
 
How is procurement undertaken and who does the procurement?  
 
How would you summarise your approach to commissioning? What 
are the key components of effective commissioning and why do 
these matter? 
 
4. Quality assurance How do you ensure the contracts are effective? 
a. How do you collect data for monitoring? 
 
What role do other parts of the organisation have? How does this 
affect commissioning arrangements? 
 
How do you use CQC reports of home care providers?   
 
How do these checks and balances contribute to service 
sustainability?  
 
5. Impact What difference does commissioning make to the services that 
people receive in your area? 
 
Tell us about any developments you have (outcomes-based 




What is the Impact on staff in care providers and why is this? 
 






Interviews were transcribed, coded and analysed using ATLAS.Ti 8 software to organise the 
data. A detailed thematic analysis of the interview transcripts was completed by two 
researchers (redacted for review) who conducted the initial coding independently. The 
researchers then agreed a set of codes together before identifying main and subsidiary 
themes. The analysis followed the six-phase process routinely used in qualitative research: 
familiarisation, generating codes, identifying themes, reviewing themes, and defining and 
interpreting themes (Braun and Clarke, 2006). This was an iterative process involving 
reviewing findings as the analysis progressed with the wider research team to challenge and 
corroborate interpretation and enable relationships between themes to be identified. 
Findings 
Ten local authority commissioners contacted by the research team agreed to participate in a 
telephone interview (Table 2). The structural variation in commissioning arrangements was 
evident in both the number of providers they worked with (two to 247), description of contract 
types and the combinations of contracting arrangements they employed. The themes derived 
from the analysis are presented using quotations from the commissioners, indicated as C1-
C10. 
Table 2: Participant characteristics 
 
 Number of providers Type of contracts Type of relationship with 









C2 100 +  Block and framework; 
multiple types of contracts 
Collaborative 
C3 36 Primary and 
Others 
Joint framework contract Transactional 
C4 17 Dynamic Purchasing 
Framework and spot 
Collaborative 
 
C5 247 Dynamic purchasing 
system 
Collaborative 
C6 2 Primary and others  Framework Emerging collaboration 
 
C7 22 Open framework Emerging collaboration 
C8 6 Primary 
15 others  
Framework Collaborative  












This section presents salient themes identified from interviews with commissioners of home 
care (Table 3), displaying a spectrum of responses across the dimensions of contracting and 
collaborating with independent providers.  
Table 3: Themes from commissioners’ interviews 
 Main theme Subtheme 
1.  Commissioners’ role in contracting home care Overseeing care arrangements 
and supporting providers 
Setting direction, values and 
strategy for the locality 
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Connecting internally and 
externally through networks  
2.  Relationship between commissioners and 
providers of home care 
Commissioning characterised by 
distant or collaborative 
relationships 
Working collectively for 
personalised outcomes  
3.  Applying and adapting a market model Systems, processes and 
organisational developments  
Chronic workforce issues 
 
 
Theme 1: Commissioners’ role in contracting home care 
Many commissioners described working extensively to review and revise their approach to 
commissioning, drawing on national guidance, policy and good practice. Wholesale 
restructuring related to changes at the organisational level, including changes to local authority 
boundaries and team structures, influenced their role, as well locally agreed strategic priorities.  
Commissioners reported enormous variation in how their roles were set up within their 
organisations and what the role entailed. Consequently, it was difficult to find a common 
definition, articulated by one commissioner, ‘When you try to explain to somebody outside the 
local authority what commissioning is, it’s not a simple…you just…in layman’s terms you can’t 
explain it in a simple way, so it’s difficult.’ (C6). Some reported that their role was principally 
strategic, understanding the local demands, supporting changes, for example through 
‘transformation of home care’ (C8), and working with providers to accomplish new 
developments, ‘we work with the market to develop those ideas’ (C2). For others, the role also 
included operational aspects of commissioning such as setting up brokerage to acquire 
packages of care from providers, overseeing contracting and ensuring monitoring was in 
place. Commissioners’ discourse revealed three essential features of their role: (i) overseeing 
care arrangements and supporting providers; (ii) setting the strategic direction for their locality 
and (iii) creating networks to achieve the aim of sustainable and reliable home care.  
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Overseeing care arrangements and supporting providers involved setting up and maintaining 
contracts to ensure care was available for the population within an authority. It was presented 
as a mediating role, with some articulating a narrative of trying to pre-empt difficulties and 
proactively prevent business failure for providers. Mediating was closely associated with 
having an open dialogue with providers and for a few commissioners, the oversight role 
specifically included supporting providers who were not part of their current contracting 
framework. 
The role involved scrutinising providers, but also overseeing the implications of commissioning 
on providers and the care that older people received. One commissioner explained that their 
role was ‘working together with the market to improve quality and our focus as a council is to 
move away from time and task and focus more on the outcomes in relation to home care’ (C4). 
Another (C3), observed that using a model based on hourly rates to determine contract 
arrangements was ‘very reductive’ and created a barrier between commissioners and 
providers through failing to fund elements which contributed to quality care. 
The second role identified by commissioners was strategic leadership, explicitly described as 
setting a ‘direction’ of travel, with the implication that this changed and developed over time. 
However, commissioners rarely articulated the underpinning rationale for their strategy or the 
reasons for changing it. The most frequently cited strategic priority was an ambition to become 
more outcome focused, depending on working more closely with providers and changing 
inflexible contracts:  
We’re developing a very non prescriptive contract, that talks about outcomes for 
people….working within a fixed procurement rules and regulations, can sometimes be 
counterproductive (C5).  
There were examples of barriers to achieving their strategic priorities, such as the professional 
culture within public and private organisations, poor understanding of outcomes and  
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reluctance to change practice and systems that used ‘time and task’ to monitor work and 
arrange payment: 
At that time I didn’t feel that the market was ready for that because we needed to do a 
lot of work towards developing a different way of working…..So to get to that stage, I 
felt that we needed to do more work with the providers and what we did include into 
the specification was that they would work in a re-abling way, so try to re-able people 
and not just hold onto them to say, right, they’ve got a package of care, we will keep 
onto them as long as we need to. (C6) 
The third feature of the commissioners’ role involved creating networks and working closely 
with other areas of the local authority and beyond to ensure smooth delivery of care. They 
often explained complicated organisational arrangements, where the commissioner was part 
of a complex network of commissioning, procurement, contracting and quality monitoring.  
Some were part of joint commissioning units across local authorities, but few jointly 
commissioned with health. An important network for some commissioners was with local 
providers who were regarded as bringing an understanding and connection to the community, 
in terms of local knowledge and commitment: 
And actually working locally with your sector, tends to bring better results, it’s a bit like 
people working locally within their communities isn’t it? (C2) 
In summary, commissioners operated in varied organisational structures and many had a 
broad portfolio of service responsibility, adopting a role of ‘strategic oversight’ without 
necessarily having in-depth knowledge of all areas within their remit. 
Theme 2: Relationships between commissioners and providers of home care 
Commissioning was characterised by distant or collaborative relationships with home care 
providers. Most interviewees were striving to improve the relationship with providers whilst 
also maintaining clear transactions in the form of contract specifications. However, 
commissioners reported tensions between contracting, that involved detailed and prescriptive 
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specifications, and collaborating with providers, acknowledging that care could not be 
regarded as a transactional process,  ‘The minute care becomes transactional…..you start 
forgetting what it’s about, and it’s about the person that you’re all striving to look after in the 
best possible way.’ (C2).  
The role of trust within a collaborative approach was also acknowledged, and regarded as an 
element that needed to be developed rather than assumed. There were a few commissioners 
who achieved closer relationships with providers through shared developments that involved 
reciprocal participation based on trust, going beyond ‘engagement’ or ‘consultation’: 
I know everyone says it, but I think it is important to spend time building that relationship 
with the providers because they’re the ones who are going to be delivering the service, 
so if you’re thinking about different models, different ideas, getting their input into that 
as early as possible. (C4) 
Regular meetings and forums between commissioners and providers were often quoted, but 
attitude rather than format or frequency of formal meetings featured strongly in the discourse. 
Indeed, some commissioners indicated that attitudes were undergoing significant changes, 
altering from an adversarial relationship to one of collaboration with providers: 
 We’ve developed quite a good dialogue with the providers, we have regular meetings 
and forums and I think probably a few years previously it was a bit more adversarial, a 
bit more confrontational, whereas now I think we’ve got more of a two-way 
conversation, we’re listening, we’re trying to work through issues together. (C4) 
The description of relationship building as a ‘tightrope’ portrays the intensity of the challenges 
experienced, with attempts to balance different stakeholder perspectives, establish realistic 
measures for monitoring and manage a large and changeable demand. As the following 
commissioner illustrates, managing the competing perspectives of public sector professionals 
and independent care providers created complex interchanges within the sector: 
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I think it's a sort of tightrope that we’re walking on, in our relationship with providers.  
And often, we’re aware that social workers are slightly uneasy with our relationship 
with providers.  I think that they'll often be of the view that we give them too easy a 
ride, and that perhaps we should take, you know, we should come down harder on 
them, all that sort of stuff. (C8) 
Working collectively for personalised outcomes was frequently cited as a key driver for future 
developments and often arose as part of the dialogue about collaboration with providers. In 
talking about outcomes, commissioners tended to fall into two groups, with those who 
expressed an intention to use outcomes to implement changes, but had little experience of 
the challenges, and those who had trialled initiatives based on outcomes and experienced 
difficulties in delivering outcomes-based commissioning. Those who had trialled different 
approaches had employed time and deliberation to commission care that was determined by 
outcomes rather than ‘time and task’ related activities. In the following quotation, the 
commissioner relates a more open contract with delivering outcomes, referring to a 
fundamental change in expectations and behaviour. In this extract, he/she referred to 
changing the culture across the social work teams to allow ‘my providers’ to adopt flexible 
working approaches: 
We’re developing a very non prescriptive contract, that talks about outcomes for 
people, and providers will get aid on the basis of delivering, in some cases, individual 
outcomes. So, we’re working really hard with teams to change that culture, because 
all that does, is it allows my providers then, to be more flexible for the person as well. 
(C2) 
There were accounts of unsuccessful initiatives, where commissioners had assumed they 
could trust providers with a flexible contract but discovered providers exploited the opportunity 
to make money, ‘we paid an absolute fortune for a service that really wasn't very good quality 
and it wasn't particularly good for the people in receipt of the service’ (C10).The dilemma of 
commissioning for outcomes without clear mechanisms for measuring success was a 
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significant challenge and some commissioners described hybrid models that aimed to include 
the notion of outcomes as well as tightly timed delivery of care:  
So, we had our fingers burnt a couple of times, so we've decided this time we really 
need to get it right. So our social care assessors are assessing for outcomes and we 
are commissioning on task and time. (C5) 
Some interviewees commented on the need to ‘shift roles’ to providers, involving them more 
closely in assessment and reassessment of service user needs and care planning. Clearly, 
such a move would be dependent on a close working relationship between commissioner and 
provider and challenged current arrangements with professional boundaries for assessment, 
such as social workers, exerting a tension:  
I think, you know, systematically we don’t engage them [providers].  I think we 
absolutely need to change that model and we need to shift roles and responsibilities 
around considerably to bring assessment and…assessment needs analysis and 
provision and purchasing much closer together. (C3) 
In summary, commissioners drew a distinction between transactional and relational 
approaches to working with care providers. This was impeded by constraints imposed by 
budgets, prescriptive contracts, untested drivers, such as outcome-based commissioning, and 
historical attitudes.  
Theme 3: Applying and adapting a market model 
Commissioners described balancing competing challenges during the commissioning and 
contracting of home care. On occasions, some of them explicitly expressed the contradictions 
and frustrations of trying to align a tight contracting process with encouraging greater flexibility. 
Various factors had contributed to these challenges including organisational restructures, 
changes to the process of tendering and procuring services, a legacy of hierarchical and 
adversarial approaches in contracting and managing responsibility for risk of service failure. 
They frequently referred to challenges outside their control concerning providers in the private 
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sector, such as recruitment and retention of care staff by care businesses, or the impact of 
competition between providers and other employers outside care.  
Systems, processes and organisational developments featured strongly in commissioners’ 
discourse, emphasising the absence of a ‘blueprint’ for success. Most perceived previous time 
and task systems as limiting development and innovation linked to personalised outcomes. 
Many commissioners expressed the desire to replace tight contracting with a more flexible 
approach that encouraged service delivery that was more aligned with outcomes agreed with 
service users. There were reservations about how this would develop, with commissioners 
referring to issues relating to guidance, costing for outcomes, paying for services and potential 
disruption for service users: 
I’ve seen some fab examples of where an outcome-based commissioning contract has 
worked, and is still working, and likewise I’ve seen ones that have failed miserably, 
because you don’t understand some of the ramifications.  But, for me, I always take it 
back to the outcomes to the individual, rather than thinking about outcome-based 
contracting, and stuff like that. (C2) 
Although there were relatively few examples of positive progress in changing the culture in 
commissioning cited by the interviewees, those that were offered expressed a desire to move 
away from a transactional relationship with providers based on tightly specified contracting. 
Fixed procurement rules were identified as constraining commissioners’ approaches and were 
presented as contributing to a hierarchical relationship with providers. Changing the focus 
from tightly prescribed activities to a more flexible approach was considered a monumental 
task:  
It is a bit like turning round the super-tanker because time and task has been the way 
it has been forever and it’s doing unto people, rather than working with people (C1) 
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In the following example, the tension between implementing regulations and providing 
opportunities for developing flexible services that respond to service user’s unique needs was 
expressed compellingly: 
One thing that I would want people to explore is, people are not those widgets, 
therefore, to have them under the same regulations as buying tarmac, seems bananas 
to me…..But, I think we’ve proven, where you’re allowed to test and learn, and push 
those boundaries a little bit, you can get better results. (C2) 
Responsibility for managing risk in the supply of home care was a prominent theme in 
commissioners’ discourse, emphasising the possible disruption to services. They attempted 
to address this by monitoring providers’ performance on the front-line and overseeing the 
quantity and quality of providers within a locality. Employing framework agreements, with 
several organisations approved and potentially available to provide care, was regarded as one 
means of minimising the risk for commissioners of a reduced supply of providers.  
We also have a domiciliary care framework…that’s also a bit of an insurance policy for 
us, were the lead provider not to supply. (C1) 
Nevertheless, adopting a framework arrangement could not necessarily guarantee an 
appropriate supply of providers. One example of a commissioner expanding the number of 
organisations meeting the framework requirements, resulted in moving from too few providers 
to too many, generating unanticipated difficulties in monitoring and supporting new care 
organisations. Examples of commissioners supporting individual organisations to avoid 
provider failure were cited, identifying those at risk from a risk profile and actively investigating 
and supporting the business:  
We undertake a risk assessment and then those at highest risk, we'll go out and 
undertake what's called a baseline assessment visit where we do a site visit to the 
provider and look at their policies and procedures, their user feedback, care files, staff 
files and things like that. (C5) 
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Commissioners described longstanding issues with recruiting and retaining staff: workforce 
capacity and competition between care providers was presented as a ‘chronic’ problem, 
relating not only to the pay of care workers but also their status. The division of responsibilities, 
with independent providers managing the workforce and commissioners ensuring the supply 
of care, left commissioners feeling vulnerable and only partially able to manage the deep-
rooted issue: 
The fundamental issue we have at the moment is workforce. We really struggle to 
recruit for a range of reasons, in a range of areas. But that really drives where we see 
providers having problems, where we see people being stuck in hospital, the in-house 
service having to pick up. (C5) 
Some perceived these issues were related to the working conditions for care workers, such 
as zero hours contracts, and managing difficult cases in the community. The implications of 
commissioning, such as using a ‘time and task’ model, was presented as a disincentive for 
workers, discouraging ongoing commitment to caring as a career: 
I think it's to do with the lack of attractiveness of some of the roles, and that's directly 
attributable to the way we commission….. … at the moment we still commission in a 
time and task manner…..the net effect on the worker is a role where you basically rush 
from place to place delivering personal care interventions in a very compressed 
manner. (C3) 
Commissioners expressed concern about the status of care workers as a barrier to recruitment 
and retention. Many considered that raising the status of care work could go some way to 
addressing the workforce capacity issues. There was a view that raising the status of home 




We also try to do is to raise the status and profile of care work within the sector because 
it's about… social care is a fundamental part of the capacity in the system….....it’s 
systematically underfunded and underinvested in. (C3) 
Discussion 
Little research to date has explored commissioners’ experience of working with care providers 
in delivering home care. This study offers an in-depth investigation of commissioner 
perspectives using carefully selected participants from a national survey. The paper presents 
the perspective of commissioners on expectations, challenges and responses to challenges, 
using their descriptions and explanations of commissioning arrangements for home care for 
older people in England. The discussion draws on the three principal areas of interest 
identified by Newman et al., (2012): (i) the process of commissioning and contracting; (ii) the 
role of markets and competition and (iii) commissioning relationships. The characteristics of 
commissioning are presented using a conceptual framework developed to illustrate the 
relationship between collaboration and contracting as indicated by the discourse of the 
commissioners (figure 1).  
Commissioners described commissioning arrangements as complex, unique to each 
individual local authority and dynamic, changing over time as directives, circumstances and 
personnel changed. It was, therefore, difficult to compare the detail of different models of 
practice or identify elements that contributed to successful commissioning in a market system. 
Such variation in concept and practice has been reported in other sectors (Davies and Davies, 
2012; Newman et al., 2012) and is emerging as a concern internationally (Robinson, 
Dickenson, Durrington 2016).  
The process of commissioning and contracting  
Regardless of policy makers’ intentions, commissioners have interpreted policy as requiring 
them to draw up closed contracts with detailed specifications. Commissioners illustrated how 
they adapted their approaches to working in a market model in response to different policy 
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imperatives, championing apparently incompatible goals. They reported that tightly prescribed 
contracts and an adversarial, hierarchical approach were unworkable given that delivering 
some elements of care, such as emotional support, were impossible to prescribe in detail 
(Isaksson, Blomqvist and Winblad, 2018). Consequently, they were seeking ways to procure 
services that were less heavily prescribed. Current guidance in England (LGA, 2018) 
encourages commissioners to adopt a more flexible approach, including recommending closer 
collaboration with stakeholders. However, other essential guidance issued for commissioners, 
in the form of a revised commissioning cycle (LGA, 2018), continues to emphasise processes 
rather than relationships, as illustrated in the summary diagram where there is just one phrase 
that refers to joint practice. The phrase from the commissioning cycle, ‘manage provider 
relationship’ (p.6 LGA, 2018), conveys commissioners as controlling the relationships with 
providers, rather than expressing a relational or reciprocal approach. Whilst opinion in the 
sector refers to a ‘deeply embedded’ model that is in ‘disarray’ (Hudson, 2018), findings from 
this study appear to contradict this; in practice commissioners are finding ways to work around 
the challenges and attempt to avoid disarray, with many showing an ambition to adopt 
approaches that go beyond formal contracting and embrace collaboration with providers, 
however difficult and unpredictable this may be.  
The role of markets and competition 
The study demonstrated how determined some commissioners were to operate an open 
contracting model to achieve changes in the focus of commissioning, despite the challenges 
of monitoring and oversight necessary to demonstrate accountability to superiors. Many 
commissioners assumed a narrative that emphasised the importance of arrangements with 
providers of home care that enabled services to deliver outcomes rather than prescribed 
activities. However, there was a distinction between those who had already attempted to 
commission services according to outcomes and others who regarded it as an ambition, 
placed on a ‘wish list’ pending further work. Commissioners gave examples of frustrations and 
failed attempts at introducing approaches based on outcomes. This related to two principal 
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problems: first how to define and specify outcomes that were meaningful to service users and 
second, how to monitor, measure and cost outcomes. Commissioners illustrated this by easily 
putting a cost on the time providers spent with a client, but struggling to specify how the time 
yielded specific outcomes. 
In summary, commissioners’ responses indicated that they found the two imperatives of 
competition, associated with a prescribed contract typical of a market model, and collaboration 
with providers, particularly challenging. Previous research has concluded that the two 
imperatives were incompatible (Hudson, 2013), noting that with open, flexible contracts 
problems exist in measuring outcomes, particularly in the context of home care.  
Commissioning relationships 
The present study suggests that commissioning relationships were changing and ranged on 
a continuum from partnerships that were mainly transactional through to those that were 
collaborative. Collaboration was linked in the discourses with shared problem-solving, 
developing services and focusing on outcomes. Many commissioners affirmed the importance 
of the relational, but fewer were able to exemplify how they achieved this. The trends evident 
in the commissioner-provider relationship as described by the commissioners in this study 
have been summarised in a conceptual framework to illustrate the differences between 
contractual and collaborative approaches (Figure 1).  
Figure 1: The spectrum of commissioning approaches related to the relationship between 
commissioner and provider as described by commissioners of home care for older people 
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Commissioning relationships were beginning to change, evidenced by reciprocity, shared 
responsibility and trust, rather than a process of ‘managing relationships’ through formal 
meetings and forums. Trust, as a distinctive element of relational contracting, included 
components such as interdependency and the exercise of discretion in making decisions 
about care packages. Trust within a contractual relationship is fundamental to successful 
practice between commissioners and providers (Hudson 2004; Rubery, Grimshaw, Hebson, 
2013; Högberg, Sköld and Tillmar, 2018). For instance, research from the Netherlands 
reported that most of their municipalities have adopted a relational contractual approach to 
social care rather than a competitive tendering model, which was cited as a source of conflict 
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in the past (Uenk and Telgen, 2019). In the context of current commissioning arrangements 
in England, commissioners and providers may require a better understanding of the hallmarks 
of trust as they work together to provide home care services, answering questions such as, 
what are the indicators of being able to trust a provider or commissioner? What are the limits 
of trust? How can a providers’ detailed knowledge of the relationship between ‘inputs’ with a 
service user and ‘outcomes’ be utilised by commissioners?  
The relationship between the commissioner and the provider is poised in a delicate balance 
between vulnerability and power. In some instances, the provider has a privileged position, for 
example in their knowledge of the relationship between inputs and outputs, with 
commissioners relying on the provider for accurate information. In other cases, the 
commissioner is advantaged, using contracting frameworks to add or remove providers as 
necessary, remaining in control and potentially minimising local authority costs (in relation to 
the financial and administrative costs of monitoring and / or losing a provider). Such practices 
inevitably determined whether providers secured workflow and profit, thus transferring risk to 
the provider organisation (Rodrigues and Glendinning, 2015). Implications of managing the 
relationship on changes in the market cannot be easily predicted; troubling examples of 
providers losing interest in local authority contracts and opting out have been reported, with 
serious consequences for both service users and commissioners who hold the responsibility 
for ensuring the supply of providers (Hudson, 2015; Hudson, 2018). 
The study had a number of strengths: the participants were deliberately identified from a broad 
range of contexts from a national survey, reflecting different approaches to commissioning. 
Employing semi-structured interviews enabled participants to talk openly and in-depth about 
the commissioning process. The main limitation of the study related to potential social 
desirability bias, with participants possibly expressing views that they considered are most 
acceptable and reflect well on their own activity. To reduce the influence of social desirability 
bias, the study used telephone interviews, introducing a distance between the interviewer and 
interviewee (Novick, 2008). Moreover, the topic guide comprised of questions probing broad 
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topic areas that allowed a wide-ranging conversation and reflection, offering opportunities for 
follow up questions and probing. Furthermore, the interviewers were experienced in 
conducting research interviews and employed techniques such as pausing, prompting and 
clarifying to encourage more detailed responses.  
Conclusion 
Commissioning, as an approach to arranging social care adopted across many countries, is 
clearly an evolving process. In the English system, it has been changing in response to the 
complex context of the home care sector that depends on independent care providers to 
deliver services. Commissioners are adapting their approaches to reconcile the contradictory 
drivers of operating in a market model whilst achieving care that delivers personalised 
outcomes. Innovative developments and improvements depend on a collaboration with care 
providers and other stakeholders, rather than prescriptive contracts that cannot encompass 
the range of care that service users require. Working in partnership with providers is therefore 
a greater imperative than promoting competition. However, it is also seen as a ‘tightrope’ 
associated with risks of exploitation of commissioners and failure of services. Given that the 
relational approach is pivotal to encouraging effective provision of home care, a better 
understanding of the hallmarks of a trusting collaboration and the constraints of contracting 
will be essential for commissioners internationally, to influence the shift to responsive and 
flexible care and the elusive goal of value for money. 
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